

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 25, 2002

**TO:** K. Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** D. Grover and M. Sautman, Hanford Site Representatives  
**SUBJ:** Activity Report for the Week Ending October 25, 2002

Spent Nuclear Fuel Project (SNFP): The Board's staff conducted a conference call with the SNFP to discuss contamination control and activity level hazards analysis. The contamination control strategy is based on the assumption that radiological conditions will not degrade sufficiently to require additional controls. While the current controls can safely halt operations if the conditions do degrade, processing of fuel will likely be severely impacted while additional controls are developed. A review of the job hazards analysis (JHA) identified that the project could not demonstrate that task-specific hazards and control identification had been performed for the main operating procedures. The JHA was limited to generic hazards and controls which encompass most of the operational activities in the basins. This raises a question as to the adequacy of the SNFP activity level Integrated Safety Management process. The staff will pursue resolution of this issue and its impacts on the start up of the Fuel Transfer System. (I-C)

Tank Farms: Shortly after workers started the C-103 exhaustor, flammable gas levels exceeding 100% of the lower explosive limit (LEL) were measured in its stack which prompted an immediate shutdown. The Site Rep accompanied workers the next day when they measured flammable gas levels in the tank headspace, which were only around 9% LEL. The Site Rep also observed an enhanced work planning session for the radiography of the flanged connection of the hose-in-hose-transfer-line that failed last January. In response to staff comments last week, the Office of River Protection (ORP) plans to make much of the Unreviewed Safety Question implementing procedure an attachment to the ORP-approved procedure. (I-A/C, III-A)

Waste Treatment Plant: The staff is reviewing the Low Activity Waste Cold Joint Evaluation and Repair Plan which was submitted this week. Bechtel National completed compressive strength testing of the cores and a dowel pull test with reportedly favorable results. The Site Rep believes that the roles and responsibilities of the ORP construction site representative, facility representative, and safety regulation personnel need to be clarified because of differences in the training, qualification, and responsibilities and overlapping responsibilities for being notified of occurrences and approving occurrence reports. (I-B/C)

Rec. 2000-2: As part of the institutionalization of Rec. 2000-2, the Department of Energy-Richland conducted an assessment of the PFP criticality alarm system. The ORP also recently completed oral interviews and walkdowns with their subject matter experts to determine which ones were qualified, needed additional training, or should be dropped from the program. The staff will review this effort next week as part of a site systems engineering review.

Fluor Hanford has been conducting inspections of the fire suppression systems in response to Phase II assessment finding at the Central Waste Complex (CWC). The inspections identified a second system with heavy deposits in the lines, including one pipe that was completely blocked. In response to this finding, facilities at CWC have been placed into standby with full time fire surveillance until the systems in each building are determined to be free of obstructions. (I-C)